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QUESTIONING PROFESSIONAL REPRESENTATIONS. THE ROLE OF MIDDLEMEN IN 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
 
It is a financial practice involving the sale and purchase of non-listed companies or their entities and 
it has seen a rapid growth in the last 30 years. Known by the term “mergers and acquisitions”, these 
transactions play a part in the current trend of the financialisation of the economy in the same way 
as the transformation of financial markets or share ownership (Davis and Useem, 2002; Orléan 
2005; Useem, 1996). The workers who carry them out are not the owners of the companies that they 
help to buy and sell, but rather intermediaries or middlemen, employed by specialised firms. They 
are finance workers just like Traders, Financial Analysts, Financial Directors etc,.  
 
The works of Neil Fligstein (Fligstein, 1990; Fligstein and Brantley, 1992), Frank Dobbin and D. 
Zorn (Zorn, 2004: Zorn et al, 2005) have played a part in analysing financialisation by demonstrat-
ing the role of new financial actors (Chief Financial Officers, Institutional Investors, Securities 
Analysts) in the emergence of new financial approaches and practices. Following on from estab-
lished neo-institutionalist works (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), this first approach connects the diffu-
sion of norms and practices on one hand with the transformation of the demographic composition of 
the elites of organisational fields on the other. We can reconcile these works with those focusing on 
accounting audits (Power, 1997; Ramirez, 2003; Chiapello, 2005; Greenwood et al,. 2002), which 
emphasise the contribution of the actors of these professions to the evolution of the technical and 
regulatory processes forming the basis of the valuations of financial companies and products. A 
second approach, focusing primarily on the structural analysis of the professional networks, exam-
ines the relationships between financial actors in greater detail in order to demonstrate to what ex-
tent inter-organisational networks contribute to the diffusion of models and norms, which may ena-
ble the reconfiguration of the system (Mizruchi, 1982 & 1996; Davis and Greve, 1997; Davis, 
2005). They proceed by pursuing and simultaneously renewing more conventional analyses con-
ducted in France of the morphology of economic elites from both the perspective of their composi-
tion and their relationships (Dudouet and Joly, 2010; Comet and Finez, 2010).  
 
This article sets out to understand financialisation based on the analysis of these financial actors. It 
forms part of a third viewpoint, which proposes to portray these middlemen in mergers and acquisi-
tions as workers. The aim here is to analyse both their activity and social conditions and to under-
stand, as sociologists of work, their professional dynamics just as we would for labourers, postmen 
or doctors. A comparable scientific project can be found in other recent works on financial actors 
such as traders (Godechot, 2001 ; Muniesa, 2005 ; Hassoun, 2005), hedge fund investors (Monta-
gne, 2006), stock market analysts (Sauviat, 2003; Montagne, 2009), investment bankers (Ho, 2009) 
or at another level, bank advisors (Roux, 2010; Vezinat, 2012).  
 
One particular issue is to be addressed over the course of this paper: the professional representation 
that the middlemen in corporate transactions form of the companies that they are helping to buy and 
  
sell during the course of their work. The focus is therefore the mode of knowledge that they ascribe 
to the companies undergoing these transactions. For example, when one of them is working on a 
Leverage Buy Out (LBO)1 of a large food distribution chain, for example, what representation will 
he have of it, of the people concerned (employees, suppliers, customers, sub-contractors) and of its 
constituent elements?  
 
The term “professional representation” will be used to denominate the images, frameworks, lan-
guage and interpretations shared by a group of workers, leading them to define a particular “reali-
ty”, pertinent to, and necessary for, their activity. The “reality” of the work is therefore addressed 
from the point of view of those who work, as both an instituting and instituted social construction 
(Berger and Luckmann; 1997). We show that this sector constructs and defends a highly homoge-
nous representation of the company, i.e. that it is viewed as a commodity to be described quantitive-
ly and abstractly, the trading of which must create value for both its owners and the intermediaries. 
It is portrayed in its discourse and practices almost exclusively as a set of numerical values arranged 
in a conventional manner. These figures (prices, financial tables, ratios) create the “reality” that is 
constructed and mobilised by the workers in their discourse and practices. The homogeneity of this 
representation can be surprising to non-professionals and can raise questions.  
 
This article seeks specifically to describe the processes at work in the construction of this homoge-
neity. We will analyse the construction of this commodified, quantitative and abstract representa-
tion of companies, the processes involved in maintaining it and also its role in the dynamic of a pro-
fessional group that is formed around the activity of corporate transactions. Following an introduc-
tion of the actors, the division and the organisation of work in this professional space (first part), we 
will show that the professional representation of the company as an abstract and quantifiable com-
modity is constructed through its activity and perpetuated by professional rhetoric (second part) and 
finally that the socialisation processes and career dynamic establish it as a powerful professional 
norm (third part).  
 
For this, we will use qualitative data courtesy of a research programme in France that dealt with 
“Carrières de la Finance” (Careers in Finance)*, which was conducted between 2010 and 20132. 
The data consists of 76 semi-direct interviews, log books, observations of several situations, a data-
base of corporate transactions and the actors involved in France in 2010, as well as from documen-
tary analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Leverage Buy Out (LBO) is one of the modes of financing in the acquisition of a company, based on the leverage effect  
2 The CARFI programme was financed by the French national research agency (ANR - Agence National  de la recherche) and 
directed by Valérie Boussard with the participation of Marlène Benquet, Marie-Anne Dujarier, Denis Colombi, Fabien 
Fourault, Pierre François, Olivier Godechot, Joël Laillier, Paul Lagneau-Ymonet Sylvain Thine and Nicolas Woloszko. We 
would like to thank the team members for their discussions regarding the method and presentation of results in this article 
during the collective seminars. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
METHOD 
 
The process involved collecting different types of data: semi-structured interviews, observations in the 
workplace and different supporting documents and professional products used in the professional prac-
tice. We also compiled a database of transactions for the year 2010. 
 
76 semi-structured interviews were carried out focusing on three topics: biographical accounts and career 
trajectories, the activity involved and the mapping of the professional space. The sample was spread 
equally across age ranges (under 30, between 30 and 40 and over 40 years old), which coincided with the 
organisational positions and the tiered hierarchies (implementation, team supervision and management / 
shareholders). The 76 interviewees worked across 48 different firms, thus enabling a representative sam-
ple of organisation types (French and non-French firms, size and age, specialisation, type of clientèle). 68 
of the interviews were carried out in Paris, thus representing the Parisian financial centre. They were ob-
tained via contacts of established contacts from three different sources.  
 
57% of the interviewees hold a degree from a prestigious French Finance Institution and 4% hold one 
from a prestigious French Engineering institution; 71% were male and 29% female. 6.5% did not hold a 
diploma from a French institution, but rather one from an institution in another country. The sample 
therefore corresponds to the 2010 transactions database with, however, an overrepresentation of graduates 
from the Finance institutions, which is attributable to the fact the interviews were carried out in Paris (68) 
and in London (8). The remaining transactions involve companies based outside of Paris involving small-
er transactions, for which the individuals involved were less qualified.  
 
At the time of interview the interviewees had either a job as an intermediary in these transactions (51) or 
were a customer (25). Nevertheless, after taking into account the career history of the interviewees, these 
76 interviews covered 153 positions over the course of their careers: 85 had worked as intermediaries, 37 
had been customers and 31 has been professionals in the Finance sector (Financial Analysts, Financial 
Function Consultants etc.) The sample therefore contained more positions (worked) than individual inter-
viewees, which thus opened up access to an analysis of trajectories and career circulation in this profes-
sional space. The interviews were also subjected to biographical and thematic analysis.  
 
The observations made were of three types. The first was an observation of the working environment in a 
financial audit firm over a period of 10 days, in the offices (including evenings and nights). The time 
spent here enabled the observation of the completion work on computers of analysis reports in the offices 
and team meetings. The second type of observation consisted of following the training of professionals on 
company valuations while the third set of observations were made at client meetings and professional 
events (forums, exhibitions, awards ceremonies).  
 
This research also included an analysis of the documents produced by and addressed to professionals: 
financial management manuals, commercial brochures.  
 
Finally, a database of transactions was compiled based on the declarations recorded in the journal Capital 
Finance. Its aim was to understand the structure and hierarchy of this sector, notably thanks to a network 
analysis (Woloszko, 2013). It numbered 665 transactions, 856 firms (excluding business law firms), 
which amounted to 2942 different interventions. 842 individuals (excluding lawyers) were involved: for 
more than 90% of them the information regarding their education and current employment at the moment 
of the interview was available and for almost 80% of them a curriculum vitae showing the different stages 
in their career could be found on the social networking site Linkedin.  
  
 
1. THE PRACTICE OF CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS: A DIVISION OF WORK 
WITHIN AN EXPANDING SECTOR 
 
1.1 Financial Deregulation: the boom of a market 
 
Since the 1980s the market for buying and selling businesses has enjoyed spectacular growth as a 
result of the liberalisation of financial markets, taxation policies and massive privatisation of public 
companies combined with the piecemeal sale of industrial monopolies (Batsch 2002; Lorrain 2011; 
Ho 2009). In France alone, the investiture allocated by investment funds to the purchase of compa-
nies with a view to reselling them has increased tenfold over the last 20 years3. 
 
This shift can be differentiated from previous ones (Fligstein 1990, 2001) as it is characterised by a 
new conception of corporate control based on the principal of “shareholder value”, which in finan-
cial parlance is used to mean the “measure of the value created by a company” for the “investors”. 
In 1986 this then-new measure of financial performance was popularised by Alfred Rappaport 
(Rappaport, 1986), coinciding with the establishment of the EVA (Economic Value Added) notion, 
created in the 1970s by Joel Stern, the founder of Stern Value Management, as the legitimate tool 
for calculating this value (Lordon 2000). As the stock market is largely “liquid” (Orlean 2005) and 
these exchanges have negligible costs, capital owners look to optimise their revenues by seeking out 
the best investments for the purpose of a resale. The “creation of value for the shareholder” is thus 
also passed on by the buying and selling of companies. In between the purchase and sale, restructur-
ing measures are implemented which aim to extract the maximum value possible from the double 
transaction, either by the effects of financial leverage by using a company’s indebtedness to acquire 
assets (particularly the LBO) and / or by demanding that the company improves its financial ratios 
which enable its price to be evaluated. This practice has developed particularly over the last twenty 
years.  
 
1.2 Actors in corporate transactions 
 
Two main types of actors are involved in this practice, namely the middlemen and their customers. 
The latter comprise the representatives of the companies being sold as well as those looking to ac-
quire them. They are, on one hand, financial executives and chief financial officers of companies 
acting on behalf of their shareholders (or themselves, when they are the owners) and, on the other 
hand, “heads of investment” of investment funds acting on behalf of the investors in these funds4. 
These actors call upon different intermediary firms to carry out these transactions, between whom 
the work is divided up into several tasks. The banks, namely investment banks, initiate contact be-
tween buyers and sellers and organise the transaction. Moreover, they produce analyses, advise on 
the selling price and negotiate on behalf of their customers. Auditing firms and financial consultants 
compile financial reports which are necessary to calculate the selling price on behalf of either the 
buyer or seller, as the case may be. The role of corporate banks is to finance the operations by 
means of the company’s debt; they produce their own analyses based on the reports generated by 
the auditing firms5.  
 
                                                
3 The report established by the French association of capital investors, which collected information on the majority of private 
equity investment funds, shows that the total amount invested went from 1000 million euros in 1992 to 3287 million euros in 
2001 to 9738 million euros in 2011, with the peak being in 2007 when 12554 million euros were invested.  
4 Investment funds known as private equity funds assemble capital from companies, private individuals and banks. The pur-
chase and subsequent resale of companies enables the remuneration of capital by the added value that the companies are ex-
pected to bring. 
5 Business law firms also play a part in this process as they draw up the contracts related to the transaction. We will not touch 
upon this aspect of the activity within the framework of this article. 
  
The roles of individuals employed by these firms, their activity, the related salary6, the title and po-
sition that they hold and the rules of promotion from one position to another all heavily rely on 
where the firm finds itself in the division of work. In the case of investment banks the hierarchical 
structure usually follows this pattern: Analyst, Associate, Vice-President, Executive Director & 
Managing Director, whereas the hierarchy in an auditor’s firm is usually: Junior Analyst, Senior 
Analyst, Manager, Senior Manager & Partner. The structure and designation of hierarchical posi-
tions in firms which perform the same activity can also vary between firms, conveying the impres-
sion of substantial heterogeneity to outside observers. Nevertheless, while the work of transactions 
is divided up between these firms and carried out by a variety of different titles and roles, the same 
professional space structured around a common objective is unanimously formed by all of the ac-
tors involved. Indeed, behind all of these variations, all of the firms share a common goal in in-
creasing the number and value of the transactions (that they handle). Furthermore, the theoretical 
knowledge and practices used are implemented across the sector, which is reflected in the analysis 
of the individual career trajectories. It is quite rare for careers in this sector to be linear, within one 
firm or performing one main activity, rather they are spent circulating between these firms and ac-
tivities as well as alternating from the role of middleman to the role of customer and vice versa. A 
Financial Director playing a part in the resale of a subsidiary of a company that he is employed by, 
could typically have begun his career doing placements in different investment banks, followed by 
10 years subsequent experience in an Auditor firm specialising in mergers and acquisitions, before 
finally being employed as Financial Director by one of their client companies. Likewise, an Associ-
ate of an auditor firm could have started his career as an investment banker, before then becoming a 
Chief Finance Operator (CFO) only to finally take the helm of an Auditor’s firm as Partner. Conse-
quently, the professional trajectories in this professional space can be viewed as a series of se-
quences, each one corresponding to one of the three intermediary roles (investment bank, auditor / 
consultant, corporate bank).  
 
The educational profiles of the actors of transactions, and in particular of the middlemen, are fairly 
homogenous. Hence, firms recruit primarily from graduates of the French grandes écoles7 in busi-
ness and engineering as well as universities specialising in economics and finance (Dauphine / Sci-
ences Po). The database that we have constructed of transactions in France for the year 2010 (see 
Box: Method) shows that out of the 842 individuals involved in these activities, 46.5% had a degree 
from one of the grandes écoles or other assimilated institution8. A mere 9.3% do not hold a degree 
from a French institution, while 19.5% hold a degree from outside France. The professional space 
of mergers and acquisitions in France is therefore characterised by a strong attachment to certain 
university degrees and educational institutions at a national level, even though some of the compa-
nies involved are multinationals, like large banks, audit firms or consultancy firms9.  
 
1.3 Transaction work: producing quantified qualities 
 
In order to buy, sell, merge or increase capital, the methods and the value of the trade of the “prod-
ucts” (the companies), of which the diversity and complexity from the perspective of their tangible 
aspect are extremely high, must be agreed upon. Like in every market, the reduction of multiple 
qualities into reduced quantities is a conventional operation, perpetrated by the main actors. Stand-
                                                
6 These companies have distinct billing arrangements: a fixed amount for audit firms, percentage of the sale for investment 
banks or percentage of the added value for investment fund management. The amount of pay for individuals therefore varies 
according to the company that employs them. The remuneration structure more or less breadth and depth variable pay rates 
(bonus etc). 
7 Elite higher educational establishments in France that are outside of the main framework of the university system. 
8 42% from the following French institutions: HEC, ESSEC, ESCP, EM Lyon, Sciences Po Paris, Dauphine, ENA; 4.5% from 
Polytechnique, Central Paris, Mines Paris, Ecole des Ponts, Telecom Paris, Supelec, Centrale Lyon. 
9 Data analysed by Nicolas Woloszko based on the “CARFI Deals 2010” database, as part of his Master 2 dissertation carried 
out under the leadership of Valérie Boussard and Olivier Godechot (Woloszko, 2013) 
  
ardised quantification enables a comparison of the incomparable qualities to be drawn (Desrosieres, 
2000; Bidet et Vatin, 2009).  
 
These workers are market intermediaries (Cochoy et Dubuisson, 2000) who do not just set the price 
of the company transaction, but also determine how the transactions are to be established. They 
have agreed upon standardised information, which enables them to both assess the value of the 
companies and to compare them. Three methods exist to calculate the value of a transaction: the 
patrimonial method, the multiples approach and discounted cash flow method analysis, each of 
which is based on a standardised set of rules and formulae10. In professional practices and exchang-
es, these figures transform both the qualitative and practical information (production facilities, cus-
tomers, competence of employees…) into abstract quantifications to provide a reputable description 
of the company as we shall detail hereafter. 
 
2. The activity of transaction middlemen 
 
2.1 The social construction of professional representations 
 
The representation that this group of intermediaries constructs of the companies that they help to 
buy and sell, arises primarily from everyday activity, as it does for every worker. Ergonomic psy-
chology, like sociology, has indeed shown that “reality” is not a socially shared construction but 
rather, a local construction borne out of a practice, being a question of perspective and practical 
activity, which seeks to fulfil a function (Pietro 1975). Workers, be they labourers (Roy, 2006), 
carers (Hughes, 1958) or firefighters (Weick, 1995) select the information necessary for the action 
required and in doing so ignore whole swathes of reality, in just the same manner that a surgeon 
isolates an operating field on a patient in order to better operate on them.  This process is both col-
lective and cultural (Ohlsson, 1985). It can generate some bias or even some errors in the represen-
tation of the situation if viewed from an outside perspective (Evans, 1989).  
 
The representation of reality that these workers construct is therefore functionally influenced by this 
“selective” and “distorted” viewpoint so as to become variable according to the job to be completed 
(Ochanine, 1978), the “material and social circumstances” (Suchman, 1987; Conein and Jacobin, 
1994) and the influencing artefacts, whether they be material, cognitive or linguistic (Hutchin, 
1995; Dodier, 1995; Chateauraynaud, 1991). It should also be noted that language plays a key role 
in the construction process of a shared reality, notably in the workplace by the frameworks that it 
imposes on the situation (Grosjean and Lacoste, 1999; Borzeix et al, 2001) and by the possibility 
that it creates for a professional group to express this “reality” verbally through its own jargon. 
 
Professional representations are thus less presuppositions of the activity or ideas that would guide it 
a priori, but rather the result of a continuous collective production process, of subjects at work. As 
with all workers, the middlemen in mergers and acquisitions construct a representation of reality in 
the course of their work, which differs according to whether the representation is being formed by 
younger employees (under 25 years old) or the older employees, fewer in number, who employ and 
monitor them and organise the transactions.  
 
Thus, a double level of activity is established in the division and rationalisation of work within the 
firms who organise these transactions. On the one hand there are the directors, who are often share-
holders (called Partners or Managing Directors) and on the other hand there are the young workers 
entering the profession (interns, juniors, seniors, analysts etc, who are typically all aged under 30 
but can be as old as 35), who are employed to carry out implementation activities. These younger 
                                                
10 For a presentation of these methods and their role in calculating value see Boussard, 2013b. 
  
workers are supervised by more experienced employees between 30 and 40 years old (Senior Man-
ager, Vice-President etc,) who organise, distribute and monitor their work.  
 
2.2 Partners: A commercial activity 
 
The “partners” of financial intermediary firms are the executives and shareholders (under different 
statutes) of investment banks, consultancy firms and audit firms. They have worked in the financial 
sector and have managed to acquire all of the professional competencies that have allowed them to 
rise to the top of the professional hierarchy of their respective group. During an interview, a deputy 
director of an investment bank who had recently been promoted to partner, explained that the core 
of her work is “commercial”, in the sense that she must find opportunities to sell their intermediary 
services, i.e. find companies to buy and sell and see the transaction process through. 
 
 “We spend a lot of time with the seller. He has got to be welcomed, listened to, understood. 
 We have to give him adapted financial solutions and set them in motion. We say “your  
 company is worth so much” and afterwards we sell the company to investors or buyers. We 
 present a sales prospectus which presents the company in the best light. It’s 70 pages long. 
 It’s objective. We cannot have any problems with solicitors. And then there’s the marketing 
 as well: it’s an annual report, sexy, you know. We dress to impress and we go out to see  
 investors. Once we have found a candidate, we negotiate the best terms” (Female, 37  
 years old, deputy director, partner in an investment bank). 
 
As the partner here stated, the work of their role is essentially commercial in nature and is therefore 
geared towards prospecting business. The daily agenda of partners is made up of meetings, be it 
meetings or lunches with former customers and colleagues, with prospective customers and even 
with competitors. They focus the majority of their efforts on creating favourable social conditions 
within their network, which is regulated by knowledge-sharing and social proximity, in order to 
maximise new business for their company. They regularly emphasise that this network forms what 
they deem to be “a small world” in which, they claim, “everyone knows one another” 
 
 “It works because you have the upper hand on the customers. It is in fact much more  
 commercial then technical. Your address book is your most important tool! “(Male, 40  
 years old, partner, investment bank) 
 
To make their work better understood the metaphor of salesman is regularly used, thus emphasising 
that the company in question is for them above all a commodity, a thing, in the same way that an 
apartment is. As the same employee remarks, this activity can happen without considering either the 
company itself, i.e. as both human and technical entity, or its future.  
 
 “We are paid for every transaction we make and so we push our customers to make these  
 transactions, even if they don’t need to” (male, 40 years old, partner, investment bank). 
 
Consequently, partners spend a lot of time presenting potential transactions to those with businesses 
to sell or to whom a purchase could be of interest, all based on calculations with the optimal value. 
When they are then commissioned to carry out a transaction, they expand their evaluations and pre-
sent detailed financial reports, which allow the different parties concerned to reach an agreement on 
both the price and financing. All of their attention is focussed on this process, thus creating a “bias” 
(Evans, 1989) in the representation that they hold of the company. For all that, these reports, as well 
as the oral presentations that they give rise to, are indispensable tools for winning business: 
 
 “When you're selling, then your job is to tell the purchaser a fantastic story via PowerPoint 
 but on the other hand, when you’re buying you have to dissect a document that has been  
  
 compiled by another firm in order to find out what the possible gains are” (Male, 37,  
 Financial Director, former employee of an investment bank). 
 
During transactions, the Partners consult with the company executives. These consultations are cru-
cial to them as they enable them to ensure that they will be able to achieve the financial return ob-
jectives that were promised to the acquirer by the intermediary. However, their contact with the 
representatives of the company is cut short at this point. Infrequently, though, they do go out to 
view production sites, equipment, workers, products, customers, suppliers, waste products etc. The-
se visits, rare as they are, are not spontaneously mentioned during consultations and when ques-
tioned thereupon, the description given is that it is a compulsory step in the process. The grounds 
for these visits can be required in order to “please the seller”, “strengthen links with the customer” 
or to ‘seal the deal”, according to the terms. 
 
 “Yes we do visit the company, with the CEO. It’s rather tiring by the bye. You have to catch 
 a train, get up early, stand around in the cold in dirty and noisy areas…” (Female, 45,  
 partner, investment bank). 
 
This encounter with the physical conditions of production is hence viewed as a shortcoming of the 
profession; an undesirable task. It does not significantly influence the representation they hold of 
what the company is, rather this information is viewed anecdotally. Ultimately, their representation 
of the company is constructed with disregard to their physical experiences of it. By contrast, it is 
based on both the calculated figures that are used to abstractly assess the company and also on an 
appraisal of the probability of making gains, based on the contact with it’s Directors.  
 
This commercial activity creates competition between partners, who focus on the number, value and 
originality of these commodified transactions, the details of which are publicised through regular 
professional events. In the imposing and ornate lounges of a large Parisian hotel, an annual “awards 
ceremony” rewards the financiers for their work in the transactions sector, whether they be mid-
dlemen or customers. Awards are presented in front of the entire industry for achievements such as 
largest LBO and the most profitable transaction. These events enable contact to be initiated between 
customers and middlemen as well as between the middlemen themselves. 
 
The importance of making both high value transactions and a high number of transactions has been 
further highlighted thanks to the introduction of tombstones11. Resembling sporting cups and serv-
ing as tangible symbols marking the end of a transaction, these objects are systematically displayed 
in partners’ offices and waiting rooms. Distributed by corporate bankers to all middlemen who par-
ticipated in a transaction, these tombstones make public the prestige of the transaction and those 
associated with it. With the existence of professional awards and tombstones objectifying the activi-
ty and its honour, it is possible to forget that behind every tombstone there is a business that has 
undergone changes in its shareholder structure and usually also its strategy. Indeed in this profes-
sional space that is so enlivened by the spirit of commercial competition, the operational conse-
quences for the companies that have been sold/resold/merged are not discussed. From an objective 
standpoint there are no direct consequences on the careers of the actors involved : two or three years 
after a transaction, how can they know that the price was right, that the sale benefitted the company, 
its shareholders, its workers or its clientèle? The answer to this question, they claim unanimously, is 
difficult to discern.  
 
Driven by the pursuit of business and the finalisation of “outstanding” transactions within a compet-
itive context, the activity of partners is to deal with the company as a commodity to be traded and 
                                                
11 These are objects made of glass or perspex upon which graphics and text are engraved 
  
whose value is measured quantitively. A second facet of their work consists of organising and guid-
ing the younger employees into producing quantitative analyses and material for oral presentations 
to be delivered to customers, in the expected timeframes.  
 
2.3 Young employees: an abstract quantification activity 
 
 “It’s 9.30am. In a closed office, with one glass wall looking out onto a corridor, sit five  
 people (three young women and two young men) around a large table. Every person has a 
 computer of front of them and all around them lie thick bundles of documents containing  
 financial statements. The young lady to my left rests her hand on a small keypad. She is  
 copying figures from a fifty-odd page document into an Excel spreadsheet. The young man 
 next to her is in the midst of designing a coloured pie chart using an Excel  spreadsheet that 
 he is to include in a PowerPoint presentation. Everybody works in total silence. One of the 
 young women, the “Manager” of the team, gives regular instructions. On her computer she 
 is collating the tables and graphs produced by the others and incorporating them into the  
 draft of the general report that the Head Partner of the organisation is expecting by  
 midday.” (Extract from the onsite logbook). 
 
The above observation summarises the daily activity of junior middlemen i.e. those who are young-
er than 35 years old. Their activity, laid down by their Associates, is to produce a quantifiable fi-
nancial representation of the company being purchased, sold, merged or recapitalised12. They pro-
duce a financial and quantitative description of the company in its current state, along with a simu-
lation of its future value using hypothetical economic modelling. Based on conjectures, they create 
prospective quantitative representations of the company, which must have a high internal consisten-
cy, while also justifying the price of the transaction. This activity, which requires a high amount of 
proficiency and skill in the handling of figures and ratios, is furthermore performed under time con-
straints. Intense night work is commonplace during the final phases of a transaction.  
 
The daily activity of these fledgling middlemen consists of compiling spreadsheets, reports and 
presentations, which are characterised by their pre-formatted or standardised nature. The process of 
collecting this information is in itself streamlined: the young employees work with constitutive fi-
nancial and accounting categories in company financial reports and also perform standard opera-
tions in order to calculate the required information. For example, one may reconstitute turnover by 
unit whilst another may work on the stock and another on production costs. Each employee per-
forms only one part of the activity within a framework of divided and standardised operations. Fur-
thermore, they themselves remark on the uninteresting nature of this fragmented and standardised 
work: 
 
 “At the beginning the work is far from exciting. For example, we make PowerPoint  
 presentations. We prepare documents and we go and find out the financial data online. We 
 research information, format it quickly and make it well presented” (Male, 33 years old,  
 Manager, M&A boutique13).  
 
Their working hours are extensive and the throughput is extremely high. They also admit that they 
have very little opportunity to take a step back and think about what they are doing: 
 
                                                
12 In practical terms this could include due diligence reports (compiled by auditors and strategic consultants on the financial 
aspect, risk analysis notes in banks, commercial pitches to customers in investment banks and business plans. 
13 M&A boutiques are companies that perform the same work as investment banks but are not integrated into a banking struc-
ture 
  
 “When you work 120 hour weeks, your abilities are affected. It’s difficult to be efficient  
 when you only have 3 hours sleep a night. You have to have mechanisms” (Male, 28 years 
 old, private equity funds, former Analyst in an investment bank).  
 
The division of work between the Partners and the youngest employees ensures that the latter are 
unaware of, and indifferent to, the final production; that is the sale and purchase of a specific com-
pany. Thus, the same worker notes: 
 
 “The analyst has no concept of the bigger picture. Typically he creates a one-page  
 appendix on frozen goods in Spain, for example. Nothing is explained to him. He is asked 
 to work faster. He has no overall concept of the project. He does small bits” (Male, 28 years 
old, private equity funds, former Investment Bank Analyst. 
 
 
The role requires them to spend more than ten hours in a closed office every day, processing quanti-
tative and standardised data on their computer. The work has proven to be tough: 
 
 “It’s no laughing matter. You are cooped up in a windowless room the entire day in a team 
 of two or three. It’s not a nice job. You spend the weekend and nights there. You speak only 
 to an Excel spreadsheet. It’s inhuman. But, it’s educational, you learn how to interpret  
 the figures” (Male, 37 years old, Financial Director, former Financial Auditor).  
 
This data handling work directs their attention to the financial measure of a company, at the cost of 
its other physical, social and qualitative aspects, for example. The employees are required to be able 
to read, manipulate and interpret figures with dexterity. Furthermore, they regularly claim to have a 
liking and aptitude for mathematical calculations as well as a virtuosity for the software used, which 
they consider to be the cornerstone of their professional skill set. This activity has been compared 
by some to the preparatory classes, which many of them attended: it involves testing an abstract 
form of intelligence, whilst being overburdened and under pressure, all against a backdrop of com-
petition. Their relationship to time and to knowledge is here similar to that of preparatory classes 
(Darmon, 2013), being wholly assessed and driven by utility and thus throwing everything out of 
the representational framework that does not directly contribute to it, or hampers it, in order to beat 
the competition: 
 
 “When you are a Junior you have to read everything and follow the structure. You have to 
 synthesise. Upon arrival you prepare a 30-40 page document for the Credit Committee  
 and then they ask you loads of questions, for example, on Romania. But you cannot have  
 exhaustive knowledge…In 15 days you cannot know as much about the company as those 
 who have been working there for 10 years. If you are in an investment bank on a merger,  f
 or example the purchase of Elf by Total, as a junior you aggregate the financial statements, 
 you make the models. They reflect upon why it makes sense but they can never know as  
 much as the Managing Director” (Male, 28 years old, hedge fund, former investment bank 
 analyst).  
 
The daily activities of the young employees thus functionally promote a representation of the com-
pany as a set of figures and standard ratios. It’s practical and physical characteristics are discarded 
and ignored. In the manner of a worker whose work has been rationalised, they are focused on ur-
gent and fragmented abstract calculation tasks and therefore highly involved in their work without 
having any understanding, interest or opinion on the final product. 
 
While partners and younger employees may be differentiated by the vertical division of their work, 
they do however ultimately have one thing in common i.e. that their representation of the company 
  
and the construction thereof through everyday activity is commodified and costed. They claim to 
know the company thanks to tables of figures, ratios, modellings and ultimately, a price. In the 
same way that this has already been observed in other groups of workers, their work thus leads 
them to sort and tidy the information and even to make it up (Ohlsson, 1985). In doing so, they cre-
ate a specific “world” (Beguin, 2004) using operational logic (Leplat, 1971; Ochanine and Zoltman, 
1973). The matter of describing the situation in order to act upon it creates a representation that is 
functional rather than true and exhaustive (Weick,1995). Hence, the activities contribute over time 
to a specific professional representation, which is supported by a homogenous rhetorical activity 
regarding the outcome and social legitimacy of this activity.  
 
2.4 A rhetorical activity on the social utility of finance 
 
In the workplace, in conferences and other professional events a continuous and homogenous rheto-
ric is emerging that equally crops up in commercial documents and face to face interviews. This 
discourse can first be noted with regards to the purpose of their work and its contribution to the 
common good. These workers regularly champion the social utility of their work, which they claim 
enables companies to both exist and grow through their interventions: 
 
 “Saving companies! That’s what made me get up in the morning. My crowning glory was 
 saving the X group” (Male, 42 years old, Secretary General of an industrial group, former 
 financial auditor”  
 
This same professional explained how basic cost cutting in order to restructure was necessary: “The 
aim was to hit hard. We were looking for maximum efficiency”. These financiers thus present 
themselves as indispensable elements of a large economic mechanism; they contribute to its suc-
cessful functioning and to the creation of national prosperity. Another employee of an investment 
bank aged 30 explains that by advising large corporations in the sale of their subsidiaries, he “is 
contributing to the stabilisation of the world”. A CFO and former employee of an investment bank 
uses an organicistic metaphor to explain the need for mergers and acquisitions: 
 
 “A company is a very unstable thing. It’s like a living organism, constantly attacked by  
 microbes, it needs to be nourished. If it doesn't move, it’s as good as dead” (male, 37 years 
 old, Financial Director”.  
 
This contribution to the common good is furthermore heralded in a finance book, regularly quoted 
during the interviews and used in offices, arguing that by focussing on one financial indicator, value 
is created for the shareholder: “Luckily life isn't all about finance. However in finance there is only 
one aim and in achieving this, one is able to fulfil all their others” (Vernimmen et al., 2012, p.676). 
This extract emphasises that the logic of value for the shareholder is all-encompassing. “Creating 
value” is considered as conditional for the widespread happiness thanks to the jobs, innovation, 
growth and dynamic that it generates.   
 
A second occurrence of this professional rhetoric draws a line between this professional space and 
that of another type of finance, the world of capital markets, which is perceived to be purely specu-
lative. They argue that “corporate finance” is a solid endeavour that is beneficial to the economy 
and they therefore take care to distinguish themselves from the actors in capital markets, who they 
accuse of being thoughtless and even socially irresponsible.  
 
 “Ask a trader what he stands for, he won’t be able to answer. Me, I know because I provide 
 a service’ (male, 30 years old, private equity funds, former investment bank employee). 
 
  
Howard Becker (1963) shows that groups that form around an activity develop rationalisations (“in 
other words, an ideology” he expands), which enables it to be self-perpetuating, thus stabilising its 
practices. Their representation of their reality is hence not undermined, but rather reinforced.  
 
3. The commodified, abstract and quantitative representation as a professional norm 
 
The representation of the activity is constructed over time and is bolstered by a professional rheto-
ric. In order to understand the way in which this representation becomes both the basis for profes-
sional norms and constitutive of a homogenous professional figure, another process must be out-
lined. The founding analyses of differentiated kinds of professional figures (priests, magicians, bu-
reaucrats, scholars, politicians) that we owe to Max Weber and also those regarding the specific 
rules and morals of working groups put forward by Emile Durkheim underline the existence of in-
terpretive methods of social situations relative to each profession (Dubar and Tripier, 1998). Be-
sides enabling the functional performance of the activity, the representations of the work are to be 
analysed in the same way as the many other norms which define what a professional role is and by 
doing so draw boundaries between professionals and laymen. The need thus arises to understand, as 
per Hughes, Becker and Strauss, based on the “modest occupations” study, the process by which an 
individual ends up sharing “the ideas and assertions” or ‘the philosophy” (Hughes, 1958) of a pro-
fessional group that he has joined. Becoming a “good” professional therefore involves an integra-
tion of the professional conception of the work, as opposed to the layman’s conception, in other 
words, according to Hughes’ terms, to see the world inside out (Hughes, 1958). As with other pro-
fessions, but here more forcefully, recruitment, selection rules and conditions for success contribute 
to this process, making the representation of the company, both commodified and abstract, a shared 
professional norm which contributes to the selection of employees who will remain in the group and 
by doing will reinforce its homogeneity.  
 
3.1 Getting in: handling figures and inexperience of the company 
 
As we outlined earlier, the majority of transaction middlemen in France graduated either from the 
grandes écoles or from selective postgraduate universities, specialising in finance. Most of them 
attended preparatory classes and chose to undertake placements within consultancy or financial 
firms. Recruiters therefore almost exclusively turn to these young workers who have benefitted 
from high level training in abstraction handling under time constraints. They possess the ability to 
support, and even enhance, the work under the constraints of time pressure and competition among 
peers (Darmon, 2013). They have seldom had any work experience outside of financial companies 
and have not had a chance to experience qualitative, sensory and tangible aspects of companies out-
side of the sector. This facilitates, both emotionally and cognitively, the work of abstract quantifica-
tion and modelling of the companies being bought and sold. Their inexperience can also be consid-
ered as a useful skill to help them carry out quantification tasks (Dujarier, 2012) as it allows their 
professional representation to be more easily interiorised.  
 
While a university degree is essential for the recruitment into the role, it is not enough. The selec-
tion process is extreme and as the candidates themselves advise, the competition is seen to be in-
tense. The recruitment process focuses on other prerequisites for joining the professional group. 
According to the conditions proposed by Howard Becker (1988) they form conventions, namely a 
common understanding of what is essential for the work and the criteria upon which they will be 
assessed. The recruitment processes for these finance workers are systematically organised into the 
form of tests, case analyses and interviews which enable the testing of the candidates’ skills and 
fluency when speaking both about a company in quantifiable terms as well as their familiarity with 
business valuation models. Having completed the recruitment phase, the fate of the successful 
workers is decided by an annual meeting where it is decided who will stay (and be promoted) and 
those who will be invited to leave the company: 
  
 
 “Out of the five who were employed at the same time as me as analysts in Paris (in a  
 prestigious bank), I was the only one left after three years. I had earned my credibility and 
 was considered as someone who they wanted to keep” (Male, 30 years old, investment  
 bank).  
 
3.2 Staying in: reliability, compliance, detachment 
 
Career progression, from junior analyst through to partner, is organised by a system of selection and 
exclusion known as the up-or-out. Every company possesses their own multiple evaluation proce-
dures which result, in each incidence, with two possible outcomes for the young worker: either they 
are promoted to a senior position or they are dismissed or persuaded to change career path. The 
integration of the professional concept of work is essential in understanding these branchings within 
professional careers (Hughes, 1958; Strauss 1992). The assessment of individuals throughout their 
career is not just limited to determining if the individual has acquired “a better idea of the required 
competencies, the work to be carried out and the roles to play”, but also to see if he has adjusted 
“his view of his mental, physical and personal aptitudes, his likes and dislikes” (Hughes, 1958, 
p.127). The upward passage from one hierarchical level to another is thus rooted in the mastering of 
social relations, mobilising categories of thought and common sense initiatives, behaviours often 
taken for granted (Garfinkel, 1987), which are implicit for those who are part of the group but invis-
ible to those on the outside. Here, at each individual career branching the professionals of the group 
are examined in three ways regarding their professional conception of the work, thus constructing 
the group via a continued process of adaptation of the commodified and abstract representation of 
the company. 
 
Firstly, in order to be deemed a good financial intermediary when under the age of 30, the employee 
must demonstrate competency in the handling of figures. He must be capable of creating tables of 
figures and models and insert them into a report to be returned to the customer without error, with 
rapid agility. Without this, he is discharged or pushed out.  
 
 “When the boss asks you to make a report, there are so many things to do. If you aren’t  
 able to prioritise, if you start to lose focus, if you don’t submit the report, you are cast aside” 
 (Male, 28 years old, hedge fund, former employee of an investment bank). 
 
A good professional of this age must be perfectly reliable and productive in the undertaking of this 
work. The hierarchical assessment thus provides a quantitative representation of the company. 
However, a Financial Director aged 32 and former employee in an investment bank advises about 
working with figures that “anybody can do it”14. There are other criteria used in order to select good 
professionals. 
 
The second test is the ability to accept to undertake the work requested without ever discussing the 
background, the utility, the pertinence or the impact on working conditions, whether they be their 
own or, a fortiori, for those of the employees of the companies undergoing the transaction. The se-
cond criterion of professional recognition is hence the unquestioning acceptance of the distribution 
and nature of the work and the working hours. After 5 years working as a junior in an investment 
bank, an employee summarises this norm thusly: “You have the choice to say no to your boss, but if 
you say no, you’re gone” (Male, 28 years old, investment bank). This norm is corroborated by one 
of the partners, “the boss”, concluding “Those who stay are those who conform” (male, 36 years 
old, private equity, former employee of an investment bank).  
                                                
14 It must be clarified here that “anybody’ refers to all graduates of the grandes écoles who form the world in which these 
employees live 
  
 
In order to stay and get promoted in this profession, the under-35s must adopt an attitude of obedi-
ence to the hierarchy and to their orders. Three young (former) middlemen that we invited to reflect 
upon the specifics of their former profession named, after reflection, the “ability to be compliant” as 
an essential distinctive competence.  
 
The third test in the professional socialisation of the young employees concerns emotional regula-
tion and is manifested by their ability to detach themselves emotionally from their work. It is  about 
them not showing that they are affected by what they are doing. A former employee of an invest-
ment bank explained that “those who progress” are those “who keep their cool, who can reflect and 
justify their arguments”. He specifies the exclusion mechanism: “those who don’t rise are those 
who fall to pieces, who become paralysed” (male, 28 years old, hedge fund, former investment 
bank analyst). The working observations, marked at once by silence, muffled exchanges and an 
avoidance of emotional outbursts, confirmed that the restraint of raw emotion, described as a femi-
nine trait, is the norm, favouring distance and coldness. This is echoed in the words of this interme-
diary, manager of a team:  
 
 “When I get stressed, I don’t start screaming or get annoyed or express it….it’s intolerable. 
 That is so typically feminine. They (the other females) are incapable of remaining  
 rational), it’s right on the edge of what I can tolerate” (Female, 32 years old, manager,  
 auditors firm).  
 
This detachment instils a particular way of feeling and of addressing the implications of their ac-
tions. A partner thus explains: 
 
 “When you start to thrash out a strategic cost reduction plan with a consultancy firm, you  
 make all of these spreadsheets in some offices in Paris just to find out if you have to get rid 
 of 50 guys. The guy (the Consultant) is paid a fortune and he doesn't see the   
 problem” (male, 36 years old, manager, auditing firm).  
 
In this professional space, the norm is thus to not be emotionally affected by the tangible implica-
tions of dealing with a company as an abstract piece of merchandise. Feelings of shock or surprise 
regarding the fate of a company following a transaction deviate from the professional norm. Those 
who have left this career have shamefacedly commented on this implicit rule, therefore giving us a 
good insight: 
 
 “We didn’t stop reducing the financial and fiscal risks, but there are also human risks, 
 social costs and we would never highlight these to our customers” (male, 36, former  
 investment bank employee, currently unemployed) 
 
A Financial Director aged 37 who we met in the tower of a large service group in the La Défense 
financial district of Paris, affirms that he now finds himself in an “impasse”. From this position he 
no longer has any hesitation in revealing to us, and also criticising, the professional norms linked to 
the representation of the company. His career path has nevertheless been pretty much standard: pre-
paratory class, grande école for finance, a degree in chartered accounting, marriage to a graduate 
from ESSEC15, military cooperation in a bank for two years, followed by six years of financial au-
diting in three internationally renowned firms. He then joined the financial management in an in-
dustrial company for almost two years before moving to take up a role as CFO in another company. 
With audible bitterness, he described financial auditing as an unbearable world of severe and unfair 
                                                
15 International business school in Paris 
  
work. What was most noticeable in this interview, in contrast with the interviews conducted with 
those employees still in the career, was his continual denouncement of the disparity between the 
financial practices and their real implications. Contrary to the other professionals we had hitherto 
spoken with, this gentleman expressed his emotions and opinions. The originality of his discourse is 
in keeping with his excluded status and at the same time explains it.  
 
The interviews with the individuals who have left this professional space thus highlight that those 
who are not capable of detachment and those who form qualitative, sensitive and practical represen-
tations of the sold and purchased companies are more easily evaluated as sub-standard professionals 
and will be excluded. The observations of these activities substantiate the gravity of  this profes-
sional norm in the daily activities of these professionals. In the offices where the teams work, lan-
guage and attitude alike are monitored. Managers publicly comment on their team members’ ac-
tions and reactions. Deviations and variances hence become topics of conversation for coffee breaks 
and lunchtimes with some young analysts becoming objects of continual derision, marking their 
stigmatisation as sub-standard professionals16. Therefore, those holding non-professional represen-
tations (non-commodified, qualitative, practical), of the company are subjected to ostracisation and 
discredit by these individuals.  
 
3.3 Progressing within: social status and the validation of the joy in a transaction 
 
The process of selection and exclusion (which is also a process of auto-exclusion) terminates by 
elevating those employees who best share the professional representation of companies as abstract 
and quantifiable products to the positions of power.  
 
The rule known as “up or out” automatically generates a high turnover. In this way, a former in-
vestment bank employee recounts that out of the 80 new juniors recruited at the same time as him, 
only 20 remained two years later. The stratum of Partners is hence the minority.  
 
To attain this level of professional “excellence”, workers must demonstrate a perfect mastery of the 
field’s social etiquette. Firstly, physical appearance is standardised: flawless physical appearance 
without excess, a dark grey suit or a discrete dress, designer shoes and luxury accessories in moder-
ation. A professional exemplifies the singular profile of his professional ‘small world”: “good fami-
ly, good student, serious, that’s me you know…I am the ideal son-in-law: polite, friendly, clean-
shaven” (male, 37 years old, investment bank).  
 
Furthermore, it is essential to know how to hold yourself and speak with your interlocutors in the 
transactions business i.e. other partners, CEOs and Directors, bankers and politicians - all of whom 
are deemed powerful people. One partner of a private equity funds firm explained that to be a good 
professional at this level, it is imperative to know how to speak “without embarrassment or brazen-
ness”.  
 
Behind these strict suits and this corporate hexis, these partners share, above all, the same social 
attitude, which is that the participation in corporate transactions is at the same time a noble and in-
teresting endeavour. This pride and sense of well-being that working in the field of corporate trans-
actions instils is explicitly promoted both in the professional press as well as at events and profes-
sional conventions. Furthermore, during the interviews an abundance of terms to express passion, 
interest and pleasure regarding the professions were recorded: 
 
                                                
16 For more on the topic of humour as a construction and exclusion process in this professional space see Boussard, 2013a 
  
 “The thing that pleases me is to work with large operations. It’s nice…glamorous. For  
 example, the purchase of Sigram by Pernod-Ricard or the purchase of Orange by France  
 Telecom. We are going to work on some massive takeover bids. The excitement and the  
 effervescence of the deal is one of the motivators of this line of work” (male, 37 years old, 
 private equity).  
 
At this point, the professional role interiorised during the initial stages of the career moves beyond 
mere technical skill. In interviews, those who had reached the highest echelons of the profession 
distanced themselves from all technical equipment which they say is not essential. They thus said 
that calculated rationality is a facet of the profession and that knowing how to play the game is key. 
The competition to be on the best operations becomes top priority. The interiorising of the represen-
tation of the company as a product becomes thus an indispensable element of professional (useful 
skill) and social (being able to speak about it) selection. To view and treat companies as products 
and describe them in a quantitative and abstract manner constitutes a powerful professional norm.  
 
Partners have a presiding influence over the professional group, both from the perspective of pro-
fessional norms and the perspective of rules and organisational (decision-making power within their 
company) or institutional (participation in professional associations and symbolic presence at mo-
ments of representation like awards ceremonies) arrangements. They participate both in the produc-
tion and reproduction of the professional norm, making the company a product.  
 
3.4 Remaining within: an endogamy of social protection 
 
Nonetheless, how can it be that these professionals want to continue to remain within the profession 
despite the constant testing that they are subjected to? As E.C. Hughes or H.S . Becker emphasise in 
their research, at the heart of the socialisation process, the professional role expected of the employ-
ee can be very different to that which they had envisaged as an applicant, bringing about crises and 
dilemmas. These then become bifurcation points when they are resolute on leaving the professional 
group or straying from the professional path. In this process, socialisation contributes to the resolu-
tion of these dilemmas (Becker, 1963).  
 
In the professional space of corporate transactions however, such professional dilemmas are rare as 
its socialisation is notably endogenous. The middlemen live and work in demarcated urban and so-
cial spaces. In Paris, the majority of their offices are located in a small area straddling the 8th and 
17th arrondissements of the city with the remainder in the nearby communes of La Défense and 
Neuilly sur Seine. They reside in close proximity to their place of work, in the upmarket western 
districts of the city. From these revered neighbourhoods it is difficult for them to “see” the effects 
of the transactions on companies, situated elsewhere.  
 
Their choice of spouse, as with that of friends, is almost systematically endogamous: relationships 
are forged in the workplace between financial specialists or those in neighbouring professions (au-
dit, bank etc.).  
 
Their experience of time is also common and typical. Juniors claim to work a minimum of 50 hours 
per week but more regularly 70 hours with almost 100 hours being clocked up by those working in 
the larger investment banks. When they are “on” a project, they work with disregard to both the 
hours worked and the consequence. They neither foster relationships nor have social contact with 
individuals from professional groups outside of their own, apart from a handful of people who serve 
them such as their cleaning staff and sushi delivery men.  
 
Contrary to other economic sectors which promote mixing with a cross-section of the public, these 
professions reinforce daily contact with the other middlemen or the customers and suppliers. The 
  
socialisation of these financial middlemen is thus done entirely with colleagues who come from the 
same schools and live in the same neighbourhoods. The groups in which these individuals work and 
socialise with thus hold the same representation of the work leaving little opportunity for them to 
see a contradiction or another perspective of it, thus minimising the risk of professional dilemmas.  
 
4. Conclusion: a specific case for a widespread social reality 
 
All professional activity, characterised by an interior division of work and social relationships, goes 
hand in hand with a continuous social construction of reality, the latter being specific to the activity. 
Representation results from the activity, socialisation and career dynamics, which are in turn self-
perpetuating. The daily social setting of professionals is different to that of non-professionals. Typi-
cally, the medical profession creates a representation of the world focused on cases, pathologies and 
organs while excluding entire swathes of their experiences of the sick and their loved ones. The 
same social reality can be found in the Financial sector. In order to sustain their daily activity and 
have a rewarding career, these professionals, in the same fashion as surgeons or firemen, construct 
and defend a specific representation of “reality”. However, contrary to others who are constantly 
confronted with reconsiderations of their professional representations in the nature of their daily 
working interactions (Hughes, 1958), these financial middlemen are untouched by the social criti-
cisms that are addressed to them. The specific feature of their professional representation is there-
fore its substantial homogeneity and impermeability to non-professional external criticisms.  
 
These criticisms however do exist with regard to the practice of mergers and acquisitions. Whether 
they be from the media, politicians or the public, these critiques are rooted in a representation of the 
company viewed as a complex space where matters of common sense, health (of the employees as 
well as the consumers and citizens), the spreading of wealth and social regulation take place. As 
with the representations formed by employees of a company, this representation is constructed on 
another “reality” according to different perspectives ranging from social, technical”, “ecological”, 
“political”, “human” and even “existential”. These other levels of reality are however not consid-
ered relevant when performing corporate transaction work. While corporate transaction activity has 
major implications on the bought and sold companies, these consequences do not cross the repre-
sentational perimeters of the middlemen and they are hence not perceived by them. In this way, the 
implication of transactions upon other levels of reality are never either considered or brought into 
question in their working practice. They work intensively in order to carry out transactions that are 
judged as “outstanding” according to the norms of their profession.  
 
The workplace of financial intermediaries is highly selective and endogamous. They spend the ma-
jority of their working time with peers, customers and suppliers who gravitate towards what can be 
called, following H.S. Becker (1988), a solitary “social world”. Their commodified, quantitative 
and abstract representation of companies is never called into question. The professional dynamic of 
this closed group is perpetuated even though the implications of their work are subjected to social, 
moral and political criticisms by other professionals whose “reality” is constructed from another 
perspective of social relations, different daily activities and career dynamics and socialisation.  
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